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A B S T R A C T
Governmental venture capital funds (GVCs) are created by policymakers around the world to support young
innovative companies (YICs) with the aim of “bridging the equity gap”. In this paper, we study the heterogeneity
in the design of GVC programs in Europe and identify the design features that are most effective in achieving the
desired outcomes of this policy. Specifically, we focus on the probability that GVC-backed companies will receive
additional funds from private venture capital investors and, ultimately, changes in their growth and innovation
outcomes. We find that the choices of location, colocation, syndication and industry focus of a GVC program
substantially influence the extent to which it is able to achieve such goals. Important policy implications are
discussed.
“…Not only are we faced with a serious investment gap; we are
caught in an investment trap. […] While investment is taking off in
the U.S., Europe is lagging behind. Why? Because investors lack
confidence, credibility and trust. […]
…What we are going to do is to set up the right system that will use
available public money to leverage additional capital that would
have never otherwise been mobilised. Every public euro mobilised
can generate additional investment that would not have happened
otherwise. And it can create jobs…”
Jean-Claude Juncker, former President of the European
Commission, to the European Parliament in Strasbourg, France, on 26
November 2014
1. Introduction
The growth of young innovative companies (YICs) is often con-
strained by their lack of financing capabilities. If sufficient external fi-
nancing is not available, governments can step in to back them. For
example, governments can offer guarantees without actually deploying
capital, or may add financial resources in the form of subsidies, debt,
equity, or combinations thereof. For this purpose, they can establish
government venture capital (GVC) fund policies under which affiliated
intermediaries, i.e. GVC funds, provide financing to YICs. This paper
addresses the effectiveness of various typical design features of such
government venture capital (GVC) fund programs.1
GVC fund policies are in place because of the fundamental economic
role of YICs, which are disproportionately important sources of new
jobs, disruptive innovation, growth and future prosperity
(Criscuolo et al., 2014). The establishment and survival of YICs, how-
ever, relies on the resolution of one severe impediment – access to fi-
nance (Cressy, 2012, 2002). Given their usually limited internal fi-
nancing capacities, YICs’ chances to survive, grow, create jobs,
innovate, and provide tax revenues are constrained by their ability to
raise external funds. In the absence of verifiable track records, weak
tangible assets that could be pledged as collateral, high degrees of in-
formation asymmetry, and the typical uncertainty of the innovative
commercial opportunities, YICs rarely qualify for “traditional” bank
loans (Berger and Udell, 1998; Lerner, 2002). This creates the so-called
“funding gap” problem where the credit market fails to clear the de-
mand for financing (Meza and Webb, 1987; Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981).
Even though this phenomenon was originally discussed in the
context of the loan market, it also affects the supply of equity
(Cosh et al., 2009; Cressy, 2002). In fact, specialized early-stage
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investors, such as professional venture capital (VC) funds or business
angels (BAs), only back rigorously selected companies. This is due to
the own resource limitations and high return expectations of such in-
vestors. Crowdfunding and initial coin offerings platforms provide new
opportunities for YICs to raise early-stage capital (Belleflamme et al.,
2014; Bruton et al., 2015; Chod and Lyandres, 2018; Howell et al.,
2018). However, these funding alternatives are only appropriate for
ventures in a handful of industries favored by “the crowd”. Further-
more, such entrepreneurial projects need to be easily comprehensible
and cannot rely on strategies or technology that should not be dis-
closed. As a consequence, many YICs with viable business models may
still have serious problems receiving financial backing. This phenom-
enon is often referred to as the “equity gap”.
Notably, the shortage in capital may also occur at later stages. In
fact, YIC financing is usually staged and involves a series of funding
rounds from smaller seed capital injections, e.g., by BAs or “the crowd”,
moving on to more important capital contributions, e.g., by profes-
sional VCs. This structure is often called the “funding escalator”
(Mason, 2016), where investors generally position themselves in terms
of the investment amounts they are willing to provide. If, for some
reason, a venture's current investors are not able to provide follow-on
financing and the funds needed are below the level of what subsequent
investors usually supply, then the funding escalator stalls. This ex-
acerbates the equity gap and may yield a structural problem of in-
sufficient capital supply for YICs at higher levels of required funding.
This is often called a “second equity gap”, where more mature busi-
nesses might face funding difficulties a second time after having sur-
vived through the first equity gap (Wilson et al., 2018).2
If the supply of private capital is insufficient to provide viable YICs
with the necessary funding, then policy response may be appropriate.
Although often criticized (Brown, 2011; Cumming and
Macintosh, 2006; Shane, 2009), a variety of indirect and direct policy
measures can be used to improve access to financing for YICs. One such
policy is to inject equity capital into selected ventures via GVCs. While
many governments across the world make use of this device
(Lerner, 2009), such initiatives are often found to be ineffective
(Mason, 2016). The success or failure of a given policy, however, is a
function of its design features (Arshed et al., 2014), and there is a strong
heterogeneity among GVC policies, which are set up in different con-
texts and time periods. Yet , our understanding of the link between GVC
program design features and their outcomes is mostly theoretical
(Lerner, 2002). The few empirical studies include Bertoni and Tykvová
(2015), who compare technology and development-oriented GVCs in
one of their sub-analyses, Lim and Kim (2015), who study design fea-
tures for private and public VC funds in South Korea, and Munari and
Toschi (2015), who assess the impact of regional characteristics on the
performance of GVC-backed investments in the UK. Evidently, our
knowledge about the efficacy of different design features of GVC pro-
grams is still preliminary. This paper aims to fill this void.
Building on the literature and our own analysis of GVC initiatives,
we identify three desired observable outcomes for GVC-backed YICs.
The outcomes originate from the broad goal of such policies to “bridge
the equity gap” for innovation and growth. First, GVC funds are meant
to be a direct response to the funding gap and the broken funding es-
calator problem described above. Many of the YICs may not be ap-
pealing to private investors in terms of the amount of required capital
or their inherent project risks. Supporting such YICs to render them
attractive for private capital is therefore one of the desired outcomes
(Mason and Harrison, 2003). Furthermore, because GVC initiatives
usually target YICs for growth and innovation, these also are two
naturally desired outcomes of a GVC policy (Auerswald and
Branscomb, 2003; Link and Scott, 2010).
We then detect three distinct hard-wired design features of GVC
policies. First, GVCs differ with respect to their location and with re-
spect to their geographic investment focus. They can be placed in
peripheral regions or economic hubs and are either constrained to in-
vest locally or can allocate funds across their country (Heger et al.,
2006; Mason and Pierrakis, 2013; Munari and Toschi, 2015). Second,
some GVCs need to coinvest with PVC investors, while others are al-
lowed to make solo investments. Third, GVCs may be required to focus
on certain industries of strategic interest to policymakers or diversify
investments across a broad spectrum of economic sectors (Lim and
Kim, 2015).
We analyze the impact of GVCs’ design features on the desired
outcomes of YICs in Europe. The European setting is ideal for our
analysis because it presents heterogeneous GVC design features across
countries, regions, and time. Moreover, the European Commission ex-
presses considerable interest in improving access to finance for YICs
and has recently established the “Investment Plan for Europe”3 whose
goal is to close a funding gap and to foster innovation and
growth.
Most of the previous literature assesses the impact of GVC by
comparing GVC-backed companies to those that received PVC or no risk
capital at all (Alperovych et al., 2015; Bertoni and Tykvová, 2015;
Grilli and Murtinu, 2014; Cosh et al., 2009). In this paper, however, we
elaborate on the cross-sectional variation in GVC design features and
their effectiveness. Accordingly, we do not need to expand on the GVC
selection process and have a simple identification strategy. We focus
solely on GVC investments and exploit a sample of 1230 transactions
originated by 72 GVC funds operating in 16 European countries. This
identification strategy cannot be used to compare GVC-backing with
other types of financing. It does, however, allow us to compare the
various GVC-backed ventures contingent on GVC policy design features,
which forms the core focus of this paper.
The data are retrieved from Thomson One and complemented with
the VICO and Reuters EIKON datasets. We consider the financing
rounds with GVC fund participation originated between 1995 and
2011. We stop sampling investments in 2011 because we need to track
their outcomes until recently. Specifically, we observe investees’ sub-
sequent development in terms of receiving additional private capital
financing from PVC funds (PVCs), their asset growth, and innovation
output. Almost half (595) of the transactions are syndicated with PVCs
in the first round. Syndication with a private investor can be an en-
dogenous decision that could affect the investment outcome in-
dependent of the GVC program design. Therefore, we run all analyses
on the full sample including syndicated transactions and on the sub-
sample of investments exclusively originated by GVCs (“solo transac-
tions”).
Our results indicate that GVCs that back ventures in economically
lagging regions, or countries with high perceived corruption are less
successful in accomplishing their mission along the three dimensions
considered above: subsequent injection of private capital, supporting
growth, and fostering innovation. If, in addition, GVCs are also located
in the economically lagging regions and predominantly source their
transactions locally, then they are even less successful in reaching their
goals. We interpret this as indirect evidence of collusion and political
interference affecting the efficiency of GVC initiatives. We also detect
that GVCs that build up industry-specific expertise and those who
previously coinvested with PVCs are more likely to successfully bridge
2 The equity gap is a strong policy concern around the globe. The existence of
the gap in the US and appropriate measures to bridge it are discussed in Lerner
(2002, 1999), Auerswald and Branscomb (2003), and Link and Scott (2010).
Guan and Yam (2015) discuss the gap and measures in China.
McCahery et al. (2015) estimate equity gaps in Europe to range between 0.7%
(for The Netherlands) and 13.05% (for Romania) of the countries’ GDP.
Wilson et al. (2018) assess a first and second equity gap in the UK between £12
and £32 billion annually. 3 Source: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/investment-plan/.
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equity gaps. This highlights the importance of learning processes for
GVCs. Our results provide guidance to politicians for the design of ef-
fective GVC programs and contribute to the literature on how to facil-
itate access to financing for YICs with public money (Cortés and
Lerner, 2013; Guerini and Quas, 2016; Martí and Quas, 2018;
Meuleman and De Maeseneire, 2012; Ughetto et al., 2017).
We perform a series of robustness checks to verify our findings.
First, we consider that the financial resources injected in the GVC round
could be sufficient to back the venture until it turns profitable. In this
case, there might be no need for an additional financing round, and our
main measure for success would be flawed. We therefore control for the
amount injected in the GVC round in a subsample for which this in-
formation is available. Second, we recast our models using alternative
estimation techniques to account for the time dynamics of the desired
outcomes and for the possible endogeneity of syndication decisions.
Third, we consider different proxies for our main independent vari-
ables. All results remain unchanged.
We also take into account the heterogeneity of YIC characteristics
and replicate our analyses distinguishing between ventures in high- and
low-tech sectors and between those that received GVC in early and later
stages of their lifecycles. We find that the results are stronger for high-
tech and younger ventures. Finally, we explore whether the design
features of GVC initiatives and their impact on YICs varied over time.
We find that the global 2008 financial crisis was an important turning
point for GVCs’ modus operandi because several GVC design features had
different impacts before and after 2008.
In the subsequent section, we review the related literature and de-
velop our theoretical framework. Section 3 presents the data, methods
and measures. Section 4 shows the results of the main analysis, and
Section 5 presents additional evidence and robustness checks. Finally,
we summarize the paper, discuss its limitations and discuss the GVC
policy implications.
2. Overarching framework
2.1. Desired GVC program outcomes
Although heterogeneous in terms of particular remits, GVC in-
itiatives can be evaluated by considering some largely shared desired
outcomes. GVC programs are principally aimed at solving a market
failure – the insufficient supply of capital to promising YICs.
In this context, the role of GVCs is to supply YICs with capital to
alleviate financial constraints (Carpenter and Petersen, 2002) and to
support the investee's development. If the backed YIC requires addi-
tional funding later in its lifecycle, then it may be possible to attract
private capital at more favorable deal terms due to the reduced eco-
nomic uncertainty and resulting lower investment risk. The receipt of
subsequent PVC financing is therefore a clear proof that return-driven
investors have faith in the venture's business plan and in the manage-
ment team's quality. In other words, this event reveals that a GVC fund
initially backed a venture with a potential to evolve into commercially
viable company. It most likely would not have survived or at least
would not have developed as successfully without the GVC fund's
contribution. The GVC thus helped the YIC become “investment ready”
(Mason and Harrison, 2001). The GVC's contribution itself, in this
context, could also provide a signal to private capital investors and thus
facilitate their investment (Guerini and Quas, 2016; Lerner, 2002;
Mueller et al., 2012). We therefore consider the receipt of PVC finan-
cing following a GVC funding as proof of a successful equity gap
bridge.
This success indicator is independent of the number of GVC rounds
the YIC may have received in the meantime. The venture may actually
require several additional GVC contributions prior to a PVC round.
However, additional GVC does not trigger success in our model be-
cause, in an attempt to avoid bad media, public investors might not
consistently abandon unsuccessful investments. Follow-on investments
of public funds may nurture “living deads” and may not signal viable
business models (Manigart et al., 2002). Consequently, we regard re-
turn-driven private investments as the only appropriate indicator that
an equity gap has been bridged.
This definition, nevertheless, does not correspond to the goals of
policymakers stricto sensu. In theory, GVC campaigns should improve
the emergence and development of YICs and not solely produce deal
flow for investors. It is further possible that a venture matures without
requiring additional capital. For these reasons, we refer to the growth
rates and innovation output of the investees as alternative desired
outcomes for successful GVC investments. The empirical literature
suggests that GVC-backed companies grow less in terms of employment
and sales (Cumming et al., 2017; Grilli and Murtinu, 2014) and gen-
erate fewer patents (Bertoni and Tykvová, 2015) compared to PVC-
backed ventures. In this paper, instead, we exclusively focus on GVC-
backed companies and reveal the impact of different GVC program
design features on growth and innovations of the investees.
2.2. GVC design features
GVC fund programs differ along at least three observable design
features that are defined at their initiation.
First, policymakers decide on the location and geographic focus of a
fund. In a few cases, GVCs invest nationwide (Lerner, 2009). These
GVCs are often located in central regions and/or financial or innovation
hubs and invest both locally and at distance. More frequently, GVCs are
regionally focused (Mason and Harrison, 2003). These GVCs are more
likely to be located in less developed peripheral regions and usually
have a mandate to originate transactions locally. The second feature is
related to their independence. Some GVC funds are allowed to act on
their own and make transactions without syndicate partners (solo
deals), while others are required to coinvest with PVCs. Third, GVC
funds may need to originate transactions in clearly defined industries
which are of particular interest for policy or society (Mason and
Brown, 2013).
We label these three policy design features location/colocation
constraint, syndication constraint, and industry focus. In the following,
we discuss our expectations about the effectiveness of these designs for
the achievement of the desired GVC policy outcomes.
2.2.1. Location/colocation
The literature indicates that PVCs and their investments exhibit a
considerable level of spatial concentration in financial centers and high-
tech regions (Chen et al., 2010; Colombo et al., 2019). To compensate
for potential equity gaps in economically lagging areas, governments
have often implemented local GVC programs to foster regional devel-
opment (Bertoni et al., 2017; Bertoni and Tykvová, 2015; Kovner and
Lerner, 2015; Lerner, 1999, 2002). The creation of such regional funds
follows the assumption that there is enough high-quality demand for
funding from YICs located in those regions (Mason, 2016). Recent ac-
counts, however, do not support this argument: peripheral under-
developed regions may suffer from a lack of infrastructure, R&D and
innovation intensity, and appropriate quality of entrepreneurial human
capital (Munari and Toschi, 2015). These characteristics result in
smaller founding rates, lower quality YICs and thus a lower demand for
risk capital (Bernstein et al., 2017; Colombo et al., 2019; Gompers et al.,
2016).
Ownership structures and governance principles in peripheral re-
gions can also differ from those in core centers and financial hubs. For
example, we can assume that the presence and influence of family
businesses is larger in peripheral areas. Family firms usually have high
desired levels of control, a focus on wealth concentration, and none-
conomic utilities, as discussed in Worek et al. (2018).
Wilson et al. (2019) reveal that family firms probably have a much
lower propensity to solicit and attract VC financing. This might con-
stitute one reason why PVCs neglect peripheral regions in the first
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place. Nevertheless, GVC programs are often located in those areas and
have a local investment mandate only.4
Geographic proximity between investors and investees is generally
considered beneficial because it improves monitoring efficiency
(Bernstein et al., 2016). However, the opposite could be true in the case
of GVCs. GVC programs focused and localized in underdeveloped re-
gions can only pick from a very narrow pool of available investment
opportunities (Mason and Harrison, 2003). Moreover, they face an
eventual lack of local skilled human capital that undermines GVCs’
ability to both select the most promising companies and to effectively
support them (Dimov and Shepherd, 2005; Munari and Toschi, 2015).
Furthermore, regionally focused programs have difficulties in attracting
skilled investment managers from other regions because of their limited
size (Jääskeläinen et al., 2007). We therefore expect that GVCs located
and investing in underdeveloped regions face stronger difficulties in at-
tracting private capital and in fostering growth and innovation for their in-
vestees.
Colocation can be detrimental for yet another reason unrelated to
the economics of the region. In fact, the political science literature
suggests that geographic proximity between the provider of public re-
sources and the beneficiary can be harmful because it facilitates col-
lusion between the parties. “…As geographical proximity makes it ea-
sier for companies to collaborate in research and innovation, so it
makes it easier for companies or other agencies to collude in their
supply of a critical input.” (Akehurst, 1987, page 160). GVC policies
may be subject to such collusion and political interferences, as politi-
cians and their representatives sometimes constitute the majority on
GVCs’ investment committees (Jääskeläinen et al., 2007). Bertoni and
Quas (2016) show that the timing and investment style of GVCs de-
pends on election schedules and argue that this is attributable to their
political nature. Political influences can distort GVCs’ investment de-
cisions because politicians may favor entrepreneurs and ventures to
which they have a relationship (Becker, 1983; Peltzman, 1976).
Schoenherr (2018) illustrates the negative consequences of political
connections and resulting distortions of public capital allocation in
South Korea. Lerner (1999) discusses the situation when GVCs’ man-
agers are personally connected to politicians and influenced by their
political agenda. Faccio and Hsu (2017) provide indirect evidence that
politically connected investors tend to exchange favors with policy-
makers. Such connections raise the likelihood that investees receive
government grants and contracts. Because GVCs are politically con-
nected by definition, they are not exempt from such allocative distor-
tion issues. This should translate into an increased propensity to select
investees of particular interest to the incumbent political party, re-
gardless of their prospects for growth and success. We therefore expect
that GVC campaigns that require local investments are more likely to be
influenced by collusion and, in turn, are less effective in bridging equity gaps.
2.2.2. Syndication
Syndication is an important characteristic of the VC industry
(Bubna et al., 2019; Hochberg et al., 2007; Lerner, 1994). The literature
has emphasized the benefits of syndication, including obtaining a
“second opinion” from a more reputed and experienced coinvestment
partner (Casamatta and Haritchabalet, 2007) and the opportunity to
reduce investment risks (Manigart et al., 2006). GVC programs that
require systematic syndication with a private partner may thus benefit
from such advantages. Empirical evidence suggests that coinvestments
between PVC and GVC funds are more likely to be successfully exited in
comparison to solo GVC deals (Brander et al., 2015; Cumming et al.,
2017). The investees produce more innovation and achieve higher
growth than isolated PVC-backed and GVC-backed peers (Bertoni and
Tykvová, 2015; Cumming et al., 2017; Grilli and Murtinu, 2015;
Kovner and Lerner, 2015). However, syndicating with PVCs may not
only affect the success of a focal deal but also influence the way GVCs
invest in the future. In fact, syndication provides them with the op-
portunity to learn from their partners (Clarysse et al., 2013). In this
context, Lerner (2002) suggests that GVC programs should be struc-
tured to complement PVC funding, which would allow GVC fund
managers to learn from PVCs. In addition, by syndicating with private
investors, GVCs may enhance their networks of contacts, which should
be beneficial for subsequent investments. We therefore expect that GVC
initiatives that require syndication with PVCs are more successful in bridging
the equity gap.
2.2.3. Industry focus
GVC policy initiatives are often designed to target specific in-
dustries, most likely high-tech industries, where both R&D cost and
time-to-market are usually substantial. It is also frequently assumed
that high-tech ventures are more innovative and yield higher growth
and more economic prosperity (Mason and Harrison, 2003). However,
empirical literature does not support this conjecture (Mason and
Brown, 2013), and public support programs (including GVC) which
exclusively target high-tech sectors are therefore criticized
(Brown et al., 2017; Shane, 2009). At the same time, high-tech YICs are
more exposed to potential equity gaps because private capital tends to
avoid some high-tech industries (Bertoni et al., 2015). It therefore
seems appropriate that the government steps in where the lack of pri-
vate capital is most severe. A high-tech or selected industry focus may,
in fact, be beneficial for an additional reason: Sørensen (2007) asserts a
positive relationship between the industry-specific experience of PVC
fund managers and investment performance. He reveals that by accu-
mulating experience, VC managers become better at selecting portfolio
companies and adding value. We therefore hypothesize that GVC policies
that focus on selected industries encourage GVCs’ managers to develop in-
dustry-specific expertise. This should positively affect their ability to bridge
equity gaps.
3. Data and measures
3.1. Data sources and sampling
Our empirical analysis is based on a sample of European VC in-
vestments where a GVC fund provides financing in a first financing
round up to 2011. We use 2011 as the GVC round cut-off year because
we require sufficient time to track these investments afterwards.
We first gather a list of GVCs operating in Europe in the Thomson
One database. This data source has some shortfalls, discussed in
Bertoni et al. (2015), Da Gbadji et al. (2015), and Ivanov and
Xie (2010). In particular, captive investors might be mischaracterized.
Accordingly, we cross-checked our GVC list with the VICO database
(www.vicoproject.org) and Reuters EIKON and performed direct in-
ternet queries. We identify 92 VC funds for which the parent company
is a government body, and we retrieve the complete investment history
for them from Thomson One. We also identify which of their investees
receive financing by the end of 2014.5 We exclude investees in the fi-
nance and real estate sectors and obtain a sample of 2142 companies
that were involved in 4724 investment rounds between 1979 and 2014.
4 For example, Mason and Harrison (2003) find a strong deficit of venture
capital investments in Northern Ireland during the period 1997-2001. Northern
Ireland is also the UK's region that scored the lowest Regional Competitive
Index (please refer to Section 3.2 for a description). Northern Ireland had
particularly low scores in terms of the infrastructure, market size and business
sophistication dimensions of the index. It further has a low level of GDP/capita
compared to the rest of the UK. In reaction to the perceived difficulties for
young ventures to raise capital, the Northern Ireland government established
several GVC funds with regional focus.
5 We finished the investment data gathering process in May 2015. To verify
completeness, we compare our data with the records in the Zephyr database
and realize an appropriate match.
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GVCs participated in 2912 of these rounds. We also gather data on
investee characteristics, namely, location, industry sector and the
founding year and information on the financing rounds.
We drop observations with missing data and those for investees
located outside Europe and finally elaborate on a sample of 1230 in-
vestments by 72 GVCs between 1995 and 2011. For a subset of 861
rounds, we identify the amounts invested. For 1150 YICs, we are able to
retrieve patenting data until 2016, and for 503 YICs, we gather data on
their total assets for the years 2007 until 2016. Both patents and total
assets are sourced from Bureau Van Dijk's Orbis database.6
Table 1 shows the distribution of GVC funds by country of origin
and reveals that one-third of the sample GVCs are located in the UK.
However, while the number of GVCs from the UK is large, the UK only
accounts for 180 of our sample transactions, i.e., 14.6%.7 Table 2 pre-
sents the sample transaction distribution by investment year, investee's
age and stage of development at funding, its industry and high-tech
sector classification, and its country. We also show a breakdown of
transactions where the GVC round is syndicated or not. We observe 635
investments (i.e., 51.63%) originated by GVCs in solo transactions and
595 investments (i.e., 48.37%) syndicated with PVCs. The distribution
of the investments by investees’ age shows that most of the contribu-
tions were made towards young companies. For 23.82% of the sample
transactions, it was younger than 1 year, and for 76.58% of the trans-
actions, it was younger than 6 years old. In the remaining 23.42% of the
transactions, the investees were 6 years or older at the time of the GVC
investment. These older ventures might therefore not strictly fit the
definition “YIC” (not being young anymore) but apparently faced a
second equity gap. The data provider Thomson One classifies VC
transactions into “seed and early-stage” versus “later-stage” deals in-
dependently of the age of the investee at funding. The characterization
follows the judgment of the originators of the transactions who report
to the database provider. This classification distinguishes 768 (i.e.,
62.44%) seed or early-stage from 462 (i.e., 37.56%) later-stage finan-
cing rounds. We define high-tech sectors according to Kile and
Phillips (2009) based on 3-digit SIC codes and find that 50.57% of the
GVCs’ contributions are made to high-tech ventures.
We refer to these sample characteristics in Section 5.5, where we
address the impact of the transactions’ heterogeneity.
3.2. Measures
3.2.1. Dependent variables
We propose three alternative measures to capture a successful
bridge of an equity gap. Our principal dependent variable – “Additional
PVC” – is a dummy equal to one if the focal GVC investment yields a
subsequent financing round with PVC participation. As substitutes, we
refer to the growth of an investee's assets and to the number of patents
granted within three years after the capital contribution of a GVC. We
measure sample companies’ growth using the difference of “log (total
assets)”. Alternatively, we could consider employment growth.
However, employment figures are only available for 418 of our sample
YICs. The resulting sample size does not allow us to detect significant
and robust parameter coefficients. Nevertheless, since asset and em-
ployment growth are well correlated characteristics, asset growth
qualifies as a substitute for the missing observations of employment
growth. The number of new patents is calculated by comparing the
patent stock over the three-year period. We describe the alternative
variables in more detail in the respective analyses sections of the paper.
Table 1
Distribution of GVCs by country.
GVC country N %
Austria 4 5.56
Belgium 6 8.33
Denmark 2 2.78
Estonia 1 1.39
Finland 1 1.39
France 5 6.94
Germany 5 6.94
Ireland 3 4.17
Italy 3 4.17
Netherlands 2 2.78
Norway 1 1.39
Poland 1 1.39
Portugal 1 1.39
Spain 6 8.33
Sweden 7 9.72
United Kingdom 24 33.33
Total 72 100.00
Table 2
Distribution of GVC investments by investment period, age at the time of the
investment, country and industry of the target company.
Investment year N % Age at the time of
the investment
N %
1995 4 0.33 0 years 293 23.82
1996–1997 14 1.14 1 year 233 18.94
1998–1999 32 2.60 2–3 years 280 22.76
2000–2001 92 7.48 4–5 years 136 11.06
2002–2003 150 12.20 6 years and older 288 23.42
2004–2005 237 19.27
2006–2007 195 15.85
2008–2009 226 18.37
2010–2011 280 22.76
Total 1230 100.00 Total 1230 100.00
Stage of development High-tech sectors
Seed and early stage 768 62.44 Yes 622 50.57
Later stages 462 37.56 No 608 49.43
Total 1230 100.00 Total 1230 100.00
Company industry N % Company country N %
Construction and Mining 63 5.12 Austria 22 1.79
Chemical Products 54 4.39 Belgium 74 6.02
Electric and Electronica 165 13.41 Denmark 94 7.64
Instruments 94 7.64 Estonia 11 0.89
Machinery 51 4.15 Finland 76 6.18
Pharmaceuticals 63 5.12 France 62 5.04
Other Manufacturing 111 9.02 Germany 230 18.70
Computer-related
Services
235 19.11 Ireland 70 5.69
Engineering and R&D
Services
135 10.98 Italy 36 2.93
Trade 48 3.90 Netherlands 62 5.04
Public Utilities 49 3.98 Poland 13 1.06
Other Business Services 92 7.48 Portugal 107 8.70
Other Services 70 5.69 Spain 66 5.37
Sweden 127 10.33
United Kingdom 180 14.63
Total 1230 100.00 Total 1230 100.00
Presence of a PVC N %
Yes (Syndicated
investment)
595 48.37
No (GVC solo
investment)
635 51.63
Total 1230 100.006 The investees were matched between Thomson One and Orbis manually by
company names and countries.
7 In untabulated robustness checks, we i) controlled for GVC location with
country dummies and ii) excluded UK-based deals. In both cases we, find si-
milar results, which are available upon request.
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3.2.2. Location
We refer to the EU's “Regional Competitiveness Index” to asess the
impact of regional economic development on the outcome of a GVC
fund investment. This index was computed at regional (i.e., NUTS2 -
Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics) levels by the European
Commission in 2013 (Annoni and Dijkstra, 2013). The index builds on
several sub-indices that consider the development, efficiency and in-
novation capacity of various European regions. To scale the regional
competitive index for the individual sample countries, we create a
dummy variable “Underdeveloped region” if the NUTS2 level's “Re-
gional Competitiveness Index” is lower than the corresponding national
average. Alternatively, we refer to “regional per capita GDP” at the
NUTS2 level from Eurostat to directly assess different levels of eco-
nomic development. To test our prediction on the effect of collusion, we
follow an approach commonly used in the literature and assess the
likelihood of regulatory capture with a nationwide indicator of per-
ceived corruption, referring to the Transparency International Corrup-
tion Perceptions Index8 (Dal Bó, 2006; Dal Bó and Rossi, 2007). The
political science literature also suggests that political campaign con-
tributions by individuals can be used as an alternative proxy for reg-
ulatory capture (Dal Bó, 2006; de Figueiredo and Edwards, 2007). As a
consequence, we obtain information from the International Monetary
Fund database on whether the amount that a donor can contribute to a
candidate of a political party in a certain country is limited. This
characteristic is coded using the dummy variable “No limit on con-
tributions to candidates,” which is equal to 1 if no limit exists.
3.2.3. Colocation
Our measure of proximity is based on the location of the investee
with respect to the location of the GVC fund backing it. We use the
dummy variable “Local deal”, which is equal to one if the GVC fund is
located in the same geographic region (NUTS2 code) as its investee. We
also create important interaction terms using this dummy.
3.2.4. Syndication
We use a dummy variable “Syndicate” to denote syndicated trans-
actions. For our measure of a GVC fund's “Syndication experience”, we
refer to the number of previous investments in which the fund syndi-
cated with a PVC partner. As an alternative, we use the percentage of
syndicated deals over total experience and name the variable
“Syndication specialization”.
3.2.5. Industry focus
We assess the “Industry experience” of a GVC fund by considering
the number of previous transactions of the focal fund in the same in-
dustry as the focal investment. Alternatively, we refer to “Industry
specialization” as the experience in a particular industry relative to
total experience.
3.2.6. Control variables
We use several control variables describing investment character-
istics that may affect a GVC fund's ability to bridge equity gaps. We
include a “High-tech” dummy and add common controls, e.g., for the
target's age (“Log of company age”), and industry, year, and country
fixed effects, when specified. In separate analyses, we include the
logarithm of the amount injected by VC investors (“Log of amount re-
ceived”). The amounts enter the regressions in logs of USD million. In
the analysis of total asset growth, we also include “Log of total assets
(t−1)”, which is the logarithm of total assets in the previous year. In
the model for innovative output, we control for the “Patent stock” of
each investee prior to the GVC investment.
3.3. Descriptive statistics
All variables are summarized in Table 3, and their correlation ma-
trix is presented in Table 4. Out of 1230 GVC investments, 390
(31.71%) subsequently attract private capital. The average logarithmic
growth rates of total assets and patents in the three years following the
initial GVC financing round are 1.244 and 1.360, respectively. This
translates into level growth rates of 124.4% and 136.0%, respectively.
Although some of the bivariate correlations are statistically sig-
nificant (in bold), the matrix in Table 4 reveals that their economic
significance is rather low, with some predictable exceptions. The cor-
ruption and regional competitiveness indicators correlate at −0.61,
and the experience measures at 0.64. Furthermore, the investment
amount correlates with syndication and the ventures’ total assets with
their age. High correlations among these indicators suggest against
using them simultaneously in the multivariate analyses to avoid mul-
ticollinearity. Therefore, we present regression models in which we
carefully alternate correlating covariates. In parallel, we monitor po-
tential multicollinearity with a variance inflation factor.
Table 5 presents the descriptive statistics of our subsamples of GVC
solo and GVC/PVC-syndicated deals. We also report the significance
levels of t-tests on the differences in means of the variables across the
two subsamples. Compared to syndicates, solo GVC investments are
significantly less likely to be successful in bridging the equity gap. Out
of the 635 companies that are initially exclusively backed by GVCs,
only 122 (i.e., 19.21% of them) receive subsequent PVC financing. Out
of the 595 companies that initially receive a GVC/PVC-syndicated in-
vestment, 268 (i.e., 45.04%) subsequently obtain additional PVC fi-
nancing. Moreover, our alternative measures of successfully bridged
equity gaps, total asset growth and the number of new patents in the
first 3 years after the investment, are higher for syndicated deals than
for solo deals. GVC-backed companies in solo deals are located in less
competitive regions and in more corrupt countries. They receive lower
amounts of commitments and tend to be larger than ventures that in-
itially receive GVC/PVC-syndicated funds. Lastly, alone acting GVCs
have lower industry experience and previous PVC syndication experi-
ence.
Table 5 demonstrates that solo GVC deals are different from GVC/
PVC-syndicated transactions. We therefore conduct the analyses on the
full sample and separately on the subsample of solo GVC investments.
4. Main results
4.1. Receipt of subsequent PVC funding
Table 6 presents the regression results of our main analysis on the
role of GVC design features on the ability to bridge equity gaps. The
dependent variable is a dummy that is equal to 1 if the investee re-
ceived PVC in a subsequent financing round. The appropriate model
specification is a probit. We report robust standard errors.
In specification I of Panel A, we regress the dependent variable on
our set of basic controls: industry and time fixed effects, company age,
the high-tech dummy and the dummy denoting syndicated deals. All
coefficient estimates are statistically significant at the 1% level and
have the expected signs. The marginal effects indicate that a venture
that is one year older than the median investee (at a median age of 2
years) at the initial GVC financing round is 1.60% less likely to receive
subsequent PVC. This corresponds to a 5.1% (=1.61%/31.71%, see
Table 3) reduction in the unconditional probability of later obtaining
PVC funding. Along the same lines, investments in high-technology
companies and syndicated transactions are 13.89% and 21.97%, re-
spectively, more likely to attract PVC in later rounds. The positive
impact of syndication is strong and could be due to a selection or
treatment effect in syndicated deals. We discuss this in Section 5.3.
8 This index assigns higher values to lower levels of perceived corruption. To
improve interpretability, we switch the sign of the Corruption Perceptions
Index and generate the “Corruption” variable, which assigns higher values to
higher levels of perceived corruption.
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In specifications II and III, we add “Regional competitiveness” and
the “Local deal” dummy. Their coefficient estimates are both significant
at the 1% level. The marginal effects reveal that a one-standard de-
viation increase in the level of regional competitiveness enhances the
likelihood of future PVC funding by 6.04% for the “average” transac-
tion. More intuitively, the likelihood of receiving additional funding in
Greater London is 6.21% percentage points higher than in Andalucía (in
Southern Spain) solely because of the difference in local development.
The marginal effect of “Local deal” reveals that locally sourced deals are
7.27% less likely than the average transaction to receive follow-on PVC
funding.
In specification IV, we substitute the “Regional Competitiveness
Index” with the dummy “Underdeveloped region”, finding that its
parameter estimate is not significant. In specification V, we include the
interaction of “Underdeveloped Region” and “Local deal” to test whe-
ther the focus in underdeveloped regions affects GVCs’ ability to bridge
the equity gap. The coefficient estimate is negative and significant at
the 1% level. We follow Ai and Norton (2003) to quantify the economic
Table 3
Summary statistics.
Variable N Mean Median Std Dev Min Max
Additional PVC 1230 0.317 0.000 0.466 0.000 1.000
Log of total asset growth (from t to t + 3) 528 1.244 0.964 1.567 −4.074 7.992
Number of new patents (from t to t + 3) 1150 1.360 0.000 3.797 0.000 54.000
High-tech 1230 0.506 1.000 0.500 0.000 1.000
Log of company age 1230 1.242 1.099 1.043 0.000 4.779
Regional competitiveness 1230 0.462 0.522 0.519 −0.858 1.192
Syndicate 1230 0.484 0.000 0.500 0.000 1.000
Local deal 1230 0.456 0.000 0.498 0.000 1.000
Corruption 1230 −7.878 −7.900 1.246 −9.700 −3.400
Syndication experience 1230 22.794 8.000 32.724 0.000 141.000
Industry experience 1230 6.202 2.000 10.911 0.000 67.000
Log of amount received (t) 861 1.253 1.008 1.053 0.001 5.612
Log of total assets (t-1) 528 6.269 6.092 2.261 0.000 14.754
Patent stock (t-1) 1150 0.710 0.000 4.670 0.000 96.000
Time t refers to the year of the focal investment.
Table 4
Correlation matrix.
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 10 12
1 High-tech 1.00
2 Log of company age −0.14 1.00
3 Regional competitiveness 0.18 −0.11 1.00
4 Syndicate 0.30 −0.05 0.14 1.00
5 Local deal −0.07 0.05 0.11 −0.04 1.00
6 Corruption −0.18 0.16 −0.61 −0.13 −0.05 1.00
7 Syndication experience 0.16 −0.12 0.18 0.22 −0.11 −0.21 1.00
8 Industry experience 0.19 −0.06 −0.01 0.05 −0.07 −0.03 0.64 1.00
10 Log of amount received (t) 0.23 0.11 0.08 0.47 −0.05 0.03 0.07 −0.03 1.00
12 Log of total assets (t-1) −0.29 0.59 −0.26 −0.22 0.06 0.30 −0.19 −0.10 0.23 1.00
14 Patent stock (t-1) 0.00 0.18 0.02 0.00 −0.04 0.00 −0.01 −0.03 0.06 0.23
The correlation coefficients are computed using the maximum number of observations available. The bolded coefficients are significant at least at the 5% level. Time t
refers to the year of the focal investment.
Table 5
Descriptive statistics of the syndicated and nonsyndicated deals.
Solo GVC investments Syndicated investments Difference T-test
Mean Std Dev N Mean Std Dev N
Additional PVC 0.192 0.394 635 0.450 0.498 595 0.258***
Log of total asset growth (from t to t + 3) 1.022 1.273 266 1.471 1.792 262 0.449***
Number of new patents (from t to t + 3) 0.697 2.257 590 2.059 4.828 560 1.362***
Log of company age 1.289 1.183 635 1.191 0.868 595 −0.097
High-tech 0.359 0.480 635 0.662 0.473 595 0.303***
Regional competitiveness 0.390 0.576 635 0.539 0.437 595 0.149***
Local deal 0.477 0.500 635 0.434 0.496 595 −0.044
Corruption −7.716 1.456 635 −8.051 0.943 595 −0.335***
Industry experience 5.643 10.493 635 6.798 11.319 595 1.156*
Syndication experience 15.729 26.149 635 30.333 37.088 595 14.604***
Log of amount received (t) 0.689 0.756 376 1.690 1.044 0.689 0.756***
Log of total assets (t-1) 6.758 2.331 266 5.773 2.076 262 −0.984***
Patent stock (t-1) 0.705 5.488 590 0.716 3.618 560 0.011
The significance levels are *: p<0.10; **: p<0.05; and ***: p<0.01. Time t refers to the year of the focal investment.
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magnitude of the interaction term and detect that for companies located
in an underdeveloped region, the colocation with a GVC fund reduces
the chances of attracting additional private capital by 14.28%.
In specification VI, we drop the interaction term and add our proxy
for corruption. We cannot simultaneously include the variable
“Regional competitiveness” because of its correlation with
“Corruption”. However, the “Underdeveloped region” dummy does not
correlate with corruption (ρ = −0.0541) and can therefore be kept.
The results indicate that corruption hinders the progress of the invest-
ment cycle. A decrease of one standard deviation in the corruption
Table 6
Effect of GVC design features on investees’ receipt of additional PVC funding.
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X
Syndicated deals Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included
Panel A: all GVC deals
Log of company age −0.190 −0.184 −0.172 −0.184 −0.196 −0.176 −0.177 −0.156 −0.167 −0.162
(0.043)*** (0.043)*** (0.043)*** (0.043)*** (0.044)*** (0.043)*** (0.044)*** (0.045) (0.043)*** (0.043)***
High-tech 0.474 0.473 0.489 0.482 0.500 0.475 0.477 0.432 0.496 0.501
(0.151)*** (0.154)*** (0.153)*** (0.150)*** (0.151)*** (0.150)*** (0.151)*** (0.157)*** (0.154)*** (0.154)***
Syndicate 0.750 0.745 0.754 0.757 0.743 0.742 0.743 0.662 0.762 0.742
(0.092)*** (0.093)*** (0.093)*** (0.092)*** (0.092)*** (0.092)*** (0.093)*** (0.098)*** (0.093)*** (0.093)***
Regional competitiveness 0.404 0.459 0.458 0.436
(0.085)*** (0.090)*** (0.090)*** (0.091)***
Local deal −0.254 −0.187 −0.001 −0.223 −1.418 −2.022 −0.248 −0.243
(0.088)*** (0.087)** (0.105) (0.087)** (0.588)** (0.778)*** (0.088)*** (0.088)***
Underdeveloped region −0.051 0.164 −0.076 −0.051 −0.057
(0.087) (0.110) (0.087) (0.088) (0.104)
Underdeveloped region * Local deal −0.721
(0.197)***
Corruption −0.126 −0.057 0.203
(0.036)*** (0.049)** (0.173)
Corruption * Local deal −0.149 −0.230
(0.072) (0.093)**
Industry experience 0.007
(0.004)
Syndication experience 0.003
(0.002)
Constant FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE No No No No No No No Yes No No
N of observations 1230 1230 1230 1230 1230 1230 1230 1230 1230 1230
Pseudo R2 0.173 0.186 0.192 0.176 0.184 0.183 0.185 0.208 0.193 0.194
Log pseudolikelihood −635.03 −625.29 −621.11 −632.81 −626.62 −627.63 −625.82 −608.13 −619.91 −619.64
XI XII XIII XIV XV XVI XVII XVIII IXX XX
Syndicate deals Excluded Excluded Excluded Excluded Excluded Excluded Excluded Excluded Excluded Excluded
Panel B: solo GVC deals
Log of company age −0.163 −0.156 −0.144 −0.157 −0.158 −0.136 −0.135 −0.129 −0.127 −0.127
(0.057)*** (0.057)*** (0.057)** (0.057)*** (0.057)*** (0.057)** (0.057)*** (0.060)** (0.056)** (0.057)**
High-tech 0.421 0.391 0.408 0.435 0.437 0.399 0.393 0.317 0.426 0.411
(0.210)** (0.214)* (0.210)* (0.207)** (0.208)** (0.208)* (0.209)* (0.216) (0.213)** (0.212)*
Regional competitiveness 0.396 0.500 0.518 0.464
(0.116)*** (0.128)*** (0.128)*** (0.131)***
Local deal −0.360 −0.230 −0.011 −0.297 −1.134 −1.872 −0.332 −0.328
(0.136)*** (0.127)* (0.157) (0.129)** (0.740) (0.981)* (0.137)** (0.138)**
Underdeveloped region 0.007 0.273 −0.051 −0.026 0.003
(0.128) (0.170) (0.129) (0.130) (0.162)
Underdeveloped region *
Local deal −0.823
(0.282)***
Corruption −0.138 −0.092 0.066
(0.044)*** (0.060) (0.318)
Corruption * Local deal −0.105 −0.200
(0.090) (0.118*)
Industry experience 0.018
(0.006)***
Syndication experience 0.005
(0.003)**
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE No No No No No No No Yes No No
N of observations 635 635 635 635 635 635 635 635 635 635
Pseudo R2 0.152 0.166 0.177 0.157 0.168 0.168 0.17 0.191 0.188 0.183
Log pseudolikelihood −263.55 −259.21 −255.84 −261.99 −258.39 −258.49 −257.95 −251.38 −252.30 −253.99
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measure increases the chances to receive additional private capital by
4.53%.
Specification VII presents a model in which we add an interaction
term between the level of corruption and the “Local deal” dummy. The
parameter estimate is statistically significant,9 revealing that the level
of corruption in a given country is a stronger inhibitor of success if
GVCs source their transactions locally. We find that if there is coloca-
tion between a GVC fund and its investee, a one-standard-deviation
increase in perceived corruption decreases the probability of sub-
sequent PVC funding by 6.98%. For a better understanding of the in-
terplay of these variables, we also compute the average marginal effect
(AME) of the GVC and investee colocation interaction term with cor-
ruption at different levels of corruption. The result is depicted in Fig. 1.
The solid line represents the AMEs, and the dashed lines represent a
95% confidence band. It turns out that the colocation effect is indis-
tinguishable from zero at the low corruption levels, while the negative
effect of the colocation is entirely driven by more corrupted regions. In
column VIII, we add country fixed effects and show that our main re-
sults do not change substantially compared to those of specification VII.
Specification IX shows the effect of GVCs’ industry focus, assessed
by “Industry experience”, on their ability to bridge the equity gap,
which is not significant. Similarly, in column X, we include our measure
of the “Syndication experience”, which also does not have a statistically
significant coefficient estimate.
Panel B of Table 6 repeats the analyses of Panel A excluding syn-
dicated GVC transactions. Even if the sample size shrinks by almost
half, the results remain stable. However, important differences emerge
with respect to industry and syndication experience in specifications
IXX and XX. Both parameter coefficients are positive and significant in
the “solo GVC deals”. A one-standard-deviation increase in “Industry
experience” and “Syndication experience” improves investees’ chances
to receive additional PVC financing by 4.31% and 3.75%, respectively.
This means that GVCs can benefit from their industry and syndication
experience when they invest alone.
4.2. Growth in total assets
We analyze the drivers of total asset growth in random effects panel
regressions according to Evans (1987), in which investees are observed
annually from their initial GVC investment until 2016. However, we
can only gather information on total assets from 2007 onwards and
therefore need to discard all investments prior to 2007 from the sample.
Additional transactions need to be dropped due to missing data yielding
a sample of 519 deals. Of these, 193 are solo GVC investments, and the
remainder are GVC/PVC-syndicated deals. The dependent variable is
“Total assets logarithmic growth”, which is measured as the difference
in the logs of a venture's total assets between a focal year and the
previous year, winsorized at the 1% level. In addition to the covariates
used in the main analyses, we include “Log of total assets (t−1)”, which
is the logarithm of total assets in the previous year. This equation is a
standard specification in the industrial organization literature on firm
growth and was used in the context of GVC, e.g., by Grilli and
Murtinu (2014). We also include the variable “Log of amount received”,
which is the logarithm of the additional outside capital eventually
contributed to the investee in a subsequent financing round in the re-
spective year. This variable captures the jump in total assets caused by
the injected capital.
Table 7 shows the results of the panel regression analysis. Specifi-
cations I to V elaborate on the full sample, while specifications VI to X
exclude syndicated transactions. We find a negative and significant
coefficient for the “High-tech” dummy. This result is justified because
high-technology ventures are often less asset intensive than other
ventures. The coefficient of “Log of amount received” is expectedly
positive and significant. We find that size has a negative impact on
growth, which is caused by the principle that small firms exhibit higher
growth rates (Bottazzi et al., 2011). We do not find that syndicated
deals perform better than solo GVC investments in terms of asset
growth once we control for the investee size and amounts injected.
“Regional competitiveness” positively influences GVC investees’ total
asset growth. Similarly, “Underdeveloped region” has a negative coef-
ficient, at least in the full sample. However, we cannot conclude that
the effect is stronger for collocated deals because the coefficient esti-
mate of the interaction term with “Local deal” is not significant. In-
stead, we find a negative and significant coefficient estimate for the
interaction term of corruption and colocation. We also find that the
coefficients of GVC industry and syndication experience have the ex-
pected positive signs and are both significant in the full sample. The
results are similar for the subsample of solo GVC investments (specifi-
cations VI to X), with the exception of the coefficient estimates of high-
Fig. 1. AME of the local deals for different levels of corruption and a 95% confidence interval.
9 The inclusion of the corruption measure and its interaction with locally
sourced transactions may lead to multicollinearity problems that could bias the
coefficients. Indeed, we notice a jump in the coefficient of the Local deal
dummy variable between models VI and VII. To address this problem, we adopt
the residual-centering procedure described in Lance (1988), which has been
used in more recent studies, for example, by Tiwana (2008). This procedure
yields (unreported) comparable results.
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tech and syndication experience.
4.3. Innovation output
Fostering innovation is usually an important policy goal in GVC
initiatives. We therefore refer to the innovation output as a second al-
ternative measure for bridging an equity gap. Using the variable
“Number of new patents” as the dependent variable, we study the im-
pact of GVC design features on the innovation output of investees. This
variable represents the number of all patents that were granted to the
ventures in the first three years after the GVC financing round. We
retrieve data on 1050 of our sample transactions from Orbis and apply
negative binomial regressions. The regression model is appropriate if a
dependent count variable is overdispersed. This is the case for “Number
of new patents”. As it is common in analyses on innovative output (e.g.,
Bertoni and Tykvová, 2015), we control for the “Patent stock” of each
investee prior to the GVC investment.
Table 8 reveals that high-tech companies backed in solo GVC
transactions are more innovative (specifications VI-X). A venture's age
has no significant impact on patent output, while “patent stock” has
positive coefficients, as expected. The findings confirm that GVC/PVC-
syndicated deals yield a higher innovative productivity (Bertoni and
Tykvová, 2015) and the importance of regional competitiveness for
innovation. We surprisingly find a positive coefficient of “Under-
developed regions”. This could be driven by selection decisions of GVCs
that operate in the lagging regions of their countries. These GVCs tend
to invest in ventures with a larger patent stock because it serves them as
a signal for innovation capacity. We find that ventures located in un-
derdeveloped regions and backed by local GVCs are less likely to file
patents in both the full sample (specification I) and in solo GVC deals
(specification VI). Corruption decreases the probability of generating
innovation, and this effect is driven by locally sourced transactions
(specifications II and III). We do not find an effect of GVC industry or
syndication experience on the innovation capacity of the investees.
5. Additional evidence and robustness checks
In this section, we conduct several robustness checks to verify our
results with respect to our primary measure for GVC financing success,
which is the subsequent receipt of private capital. In particular, we
control for the amount injected, use an alternative model specification,
control for the potential endogeneity of syndication, apply substitutes
for some covariates, and finally analyze the detected effects in split
samples.
5.1. Controlling for the resources injected
Thus far, we have neglected that the capital contribution in the GVC
round could be sufficient to completely cover the financing require-
ments of an investee until it breaks even and hence subsequent funding
would not be required. In this case, our main success measure would be
flawed. Therefore, the GVC round financing volume could itself be a
negative predictor of the likelihood of a subsequent financing round.
The variable “Log of amount received” captures this effect. However,
the data are only available for a subset of 861 deals (of which 376 solo
deals), as shown in Table 3. For this reason, we do not include this
variable in all of our analyses. The results including it are reported in
Table 9 and reveal that the effect of the amount injected in the GVC
round is positive, in contrast to the expectation. The coefficient esti-
mate is significant at the 1% level in the full sample (specifications I-V)
and at the 10% level in three solo deals regressions (specifications VII,
IX, and X). The marginal effect in specification I is such that receiving
an additional 1 million USD over the median GVC round financing
volume improves the chances to receive additional PVC financing by
Table 7
Effect of GVC design features on investees’ total asset growth.
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X
Syndicated deals Included Included Included Included Included Excluded Excluded Excluded Excluded Excluded
Log of company age −0.036 −0.033 −0.039 −0.016 0.003 −0.027 (0.056) −0.025 −0.031 −0.013 −0.011
(0.041) (0.042) (0.042) (0.039) (0.039) (0.055) (0.054) (0.050) (0.051)
High-tech −0.174 −0.182 −0.193 −0.165 −0.156 −0.039 −0.043 −0.063 −0.024 −0.031
(0.078)⁎⁎ (0.077)⁎⁎ (0.075)⁎⁎ (0.077)⁎⁎ (0.076)⁎⁎ (0.082) (0.082) (0.081) (0.082) (0.081)
Log of amount received (t) 0.164 0.163 0.162 0.162 0.162 0.111 0.110 0.110 0.106 0.106
(0.016)⁎⁎⁎ (0.016)⁎⁎⁎ (0.016)⁎⁎⁎ (0.017)⁎⁎⁎ (0.017)⁎⁎⁎ (0.052)⁎⁎ (0.052) (0.052)⁎⁎ (0.052)⁎⁎ (0.051)⁎⁎
Log total assets (t-1) −0.204 −0.204 −0.204 −0.206 −0.205 −0.172 −0.171 −0.173 −0.169 −0.168
(0.043)⁎⁎⁎ (0.043)⁎⁎⁎ (0.043)⁎⁎⁎ (0.044)⁎⁎⁎ (0.043)⁎⁎⁎ (0.046)⁎⁎⁎ (0.045) (0.045)⁎⁎⁎ (0.045)⁎⁎⁎ (0.044)⁎⁎⁎
Syndicate −0.032 −0.032 (0.048) −0.030 (0.048) −0.038 −0.052
(0.047) (0.048) (0.045)
Regional competitiveness 0.172 0.163 0.135 0.124
(0.052)⁎⁎⁎ (0.047)⁎⁎⁎ (0.075)* (0.066)*
Local deal −0.060 −0.024 −0.692 −0.046 −0.034 −0.095 −0.081 −0.731 −0.097 −0.084
(0.059) (0.052) (0.236)⁎⁎⁎ (0.058) (0.054) (0.081) (0.064) (0.272)⁎⁎⁎ (0.054)* (0.055)
Underdeveloped region −0.111 −0.082 −0.076 −0.038 −0.026 −0.003
(0.057)* (0.043)* (0.044)* (0.068) (0.061) (0.063)
Underdeveloped region * Local deal 0.150 0.067
(0.093) (0.151)
Corruption −0.021 0.025 −0.005 0.039
(0.073) (0.080) (0.064) (0.070)
Corruption * Local deal −0.085 −0.083
(0.031)⁎⁎⁎ (0.038)⁎⁎⁎
Industry experience 0.006 0.005
(0.001)⁎⁎⁎ (0.002)⁎⁎
Syndication experience 0.003 0.001
(0.001)⁎⁎⁎ (0.001)
N of observations 3041 3041 3041 3041 3041 1166 1166 1166 1166 1166
N of companies 519 519 519 519 519 193 193 193 193 193
R2 0.156 0.155 0.156 0.16 0.164 0.186 0.186 0.189 0.192 0.19
This table reports the coefficients and robust standard errors (in brackets) of the random effect panel regressions of the dependent variable “Log of total asset growth”
on different sets of independent variables and controls. Standard errors are clustered around VC names. Industry, time and country fixed effects, as well as a constant
term, are included in all estimates. The significance levels are *: p<0.10; **: p<0.05; and ***: p<0.01.
Y. Alperovych, et al. Research Policy xxx (xxxx) xxxx
10
2.10%. This finding is contrary to our expectation but points to an
important characteristic of GVC activity. If they invest higher amounts,
they do not decrease the likelihood of a subsequent funding round.
Importantly, our main results remain unaffected. Nevertheless, the
statistical significance decreases for some parameter estimates due to
the reduced number of observations.
5.2. Alternative model specification
The analyses in Table 6 only consider the event of an additional
financing round with PVC participation. These analyses do not take into
account how much time it takes until the event. A proportional hazard
Cox (1972) model captures the joint effect of the likelihood of the event
and the elapsed time. This model was applied to the VC context in
Bertoni and Groh (2014), Chang (2004), Giot and
Schwienbacher (2007) and Guerini and Quas (2016). We use it to
model the receipt of additional PVC based on the hazard rates, i.e., the
probability that an event occurs at a certain time, contingent on it not
having occurred before. In our setting, the elapsed time between the
initial and the subsequent financing round determines the hazard rate.
If a particular investee never receives subsequent funding, we refer to
the elapsed time between the initial transaction and the cut-off year
2014. The successful event (“Additional PVC”) follows, on average,
1.84 years after the initial GVC round. Table 10 presents the results of
the Cox regressions and reveals that our general findings hold. How-
ever, some coefficient estimates have higher standard errors and thus
lower significance levels than those in the probit models. The results are
robust for both the full sample, including syndicated transactions, and
the sample of transactions sourced by GVC funds only. In this analysis,
we also find that GVC syndication experience has a weakly significant
effect in the full sample (specification V).
5.3. Potential endogeneity of syndication
Table 6 indicates that the likelihood that a GVC-backed company
will receive follow-on capital from a PVC is greater if the initial round is
syndicated. It is possible that this result is driven by unobserved factors
explaining both the syndication decisions and the receipt of subsequent
PVC financing. For example, the quality of a deal is unobservable to us
but is observable by the investors. High-quality investments are more
likely to be syndicated and to receive follow-up on funding. To control
for this potential endogeneity of the “Syndicate” variable, we resort to
recursive bivariate probit models (see Greene, 2011, pp. 778–785 for
details). These allow us to simultaneously estimate the conditional
likelihood that the initial GVC round is a syndicated transaction and
that the focal target company receives subsequent PVC financing. In the
outcome regression, the dependent variable remains “additional PVC”.
The dependent variable of the selection model is “Syndication”. We
refer to the target's age, high-tech status, GVC syndication experience
and a new variable “Number of active PVC investors” as explanatory
variables. “Number of active PVC investors” is defined as the number of
PVC funds with investment activity in the focal investee country and in
the focal year. It captures the availability of potential private syndica-
tion partners for GVCs.
Table 11 presents the bivariate probit results. Expectedly, GVCs
with greater syndication experience and those having deeper pools of
potential syndication partners are more likely to syndicate. Further-
more, syndicates have a higher propensity to target high-tech investees.
Table 11 confirms our previous results on the receipt of additional PVC.
We also observe that the decision to syndicate is indeed affected by
some unobserved heterogeneity. This is captured by the correlation
coefficients (ρ) between the error terms of the selection and outcome
equations. These correlations are negative and significant in all speci-
fications. This result indicates that unobserved factors that affect both
Table 8
Effect of GVC design features on investees’ patenting activities.
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X
Syndicated deals Included Included Included Included Included Excluded Excluded Excluded Excluded Excluded
Log of company age −0.078 −0.029 −0.041 −0.057 −0.066 0.009 0.076 0.072 0.014 0.007
(0.070) (0.071) (0.071) (0.069) (0.068) (0.098) (0.099) (0.099) (0.102) (0.101)
High-tech 0.108 0.152 0.149 0.107 0.107 0.638 0.709 0.697 0.596 0.619
(0.209) (0.207) (0.208) (0.203) (0.203)⁎⁎⁎ (0.286)⁎⁎⁎ (0.272)⁎⁎⁎ (0.275)⁎⁎ (0.274)⁎⁎ (0.272)⁎⁎⁎
Patent stock 0.118 0.110 0.109 0.118 0.118 0.092 0.089 0.088 0.095 0.097
(0.030)⁎⁎⁎ (0.028)⁎⁎⁎ (0.029)⁎⁎⁎ (0.030)⁎⁎⁎ (0.031)⁎⁎⁎ (0.033)⁎⁎⁎ (0.034)⁎⁎⁎ (0.033)⁎⁎⁎ (0.039)⁎⁎ (0.040)⁎⁎⁎
Syndicate 0.908 0.894 0.893 0.906 0.928
(0.138)⁎⁎⁎ (0.139)⁎⁎⁎ (0.138)⁎⁎⁎ (0.137)⁎⁎⁎ (0.136)⁎⁎⁎
Regional competitiveness 0.346 0.366 0.501 0.538
(0.136)⁎⁎ (0.137)⁎⁎⁎ (0.198)⁎⁎ (0.202)⁎⁎⁎
Local deal 0.067 −0.175 −1.775 −0.294 −0.307 −0.022 −0.466 −1.169 −0.542 −0.559
(0.166) (0.136) (0.939)* (0.132)⁎⁎ (0.133)⁎⁎ (0.250) (0.207)⁎⁎⁎ (1.167) (0.208)⁎⁎⁎ (0.211)⁎⁎⁎
Underdeveloped region 0.468 0.241 0.270 0.665 0.175 0.202
(0.178)⁎⁎⁎ (0.140)* (0.143)* (0.256)⁎⁎⁎ (0.202) (0.212)
Underdeveloped region *Local deal −0.645 −1.102
(0.265)⁎⁎ (0.441)⁎⁎
Corruption −0.171 −0.087 −0.242 −0.204
(0.058)⁎⁎⁎ (0.083) (0.070)⁎⁎⁎ (0.098)⁎⁎
Corruption * Local deal −0.201 −0.089
(0.116)* (0.143)
Industry experience −0.007 −0.018
(0.010) (0.012)
Syndication experience −0.004 −0.004
(0.003) (0.004)
lnα 1.014 1.008 0.999 1.021 1.018 1.082 1.058 1.053 1.099 1.103
(0.093)⁎⁎⁎ (0.093)⁎⁎⁎ (0.093) (0.092)⁎⁎⁎ (0.091)⁎⁎⁎ (0.155)⁎⁎⁎ (0.154)⁎⁎⁎ (0.155)⁎⁎⁎ (0.148)⁎⁎⁎ (0.147)⁎⁎⁎
N of observations 1150 1150 1150 1150 1150 590 590 590 590 590
Pseudo R2 0.085 0.087 0.088 0.085 0.085 0.098 0.101 0.102 0.098 0.097
Log likelihood −1445.872 −1443.697 −1441.995 −1446.581 −1446.004 −524.121 −522.22 −522.039 −524.063 −524.63
This table reports the coefficients and robust standard errors (in brackets) of the negative binomial regressions of the dependent variable “Number of new patents” on
different sets of independent variables and controls. The significance levels are *: p<0.10; **: p<0.05; and ***: p<0.01. Industry and time fixed effects, as well as a
constant term, are included in all estimates.
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Table 9
Effect of GVC design features on investees’ receipt of additional PVC funding: controlling for the amount injected in the GVC round.
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X
Syndicated deals Included Included Included Included Included Excluded Excluded Excluded Excluded Excluded
Log of company age −0.228 −0.213 −0.215 −0.211 −0.213 −0.160 −0.137 −0.137 −0.141 −0.138
(0.054)⁎⁎⁎ (0.054)⁎⁎⁎ (0.055)⁎⁎⁎ (0.054)⁎⁎⁎ (0.054)⁎⁎⁎ (0.075)⁎⁎ (0.077)* (0.077)* (0.078)* (0.078)*
High-tech 0.482 0.446 0.449 0.460 0.458 0.489 0.407 0.405 0.430 0.410
(0.187)⁎⁎⁎ (0.186)⁎⁎⁎ (0.187)⁎⁎ (0.188)⁎⁎⁎ (0.187)⁎⁎ (0.263)* (0.265) (0.265) (0.268) (0.269)
Regional competitiveness 0.395 0.391 0.525 0.475
(0.101)⁎⁎⁎ (0.103)⁎⁎⁎ (0.150)⁎⁎⁎ (0.155)⁎⁎⁎
Log of amount received 0.209 0.231 0.228 0.214 0.212 0.140 0.185 0.178 0.198 0.197
(0.055)⁎⁎⁎ (0.055)⁎⁎⁎ (0.055)⁎⁎⁎ (0.054)⁎⁎⁎ (0.054)⁎⁎⁎ (0.111) (0.111)* (0.112) (0.112)* (0.110)*
Syndicate 0.331 0.309 0.317 0.347 0.341
(0.117)⁎⁎⁎ (0.117)⁎⁎⁎ (0.118)⁎⁎⁎ (0.117)⁎⁎⁎ (0.117)⁎⁎⁎
Local deal 0.068 −0.180 −1.435 −0.224 −0.225 0.087 −0.305 −1.096 −0.289 −0.281
(0.123) (0.102)* (0.699)⁎⁎ (0.100)⁎⁎ (0.100)⁎⁎ (0.200) (0.161) (1.002) (0.168)* (0.169)*
Underdeveloped region 0.291 0.007 0.036 0.368 −0.153 −0.118
(0.135)⁎⁎⁎ (0.106) (0.107) (0.224) (0.166) (0.172)
Underdeveloped region * Local deal −0.872 −1.552
(0.235)⁎⁎⁎ (0.404)⁎⁎⁎
Corruption −0.138 −0.059 −0.197 −0.146
(0.043)⁎⁎⁎ (0.065) (0.060)⁎⁎⁎ (0.094)
Corruption * Local deal −0.156 −0.099
(0.086)* (0.123)
Industry experience 0.005 0.014
(0.005) (0.007)*
Syndication experience 0.001 0.005
(0.002) (0.003)
N of observations 861 861 861 861 861 376 376 376 376 376
Pseudo R2 0.186 0.182 0.185 0.187 0.186 0.189 0.178 0.179 0.186 0.183
Log pseudolikelihood −466.80 −468.78 −467.25 −466.13 −466.47 −172.42 −174.76 −174.44 −173.06 −173.55
This table reports the coefficients and robust standard errors (in brackets) of the probit regressions of our dependent variable “Additional PVC” on different sets of
independent variables and controls. Industry and time fixed effects, as well as a constant term, are included in all models. The significance levels are *: p<0.10; **:
p<0.05; and ***: p<0.01. Columns 1-VI include all deals, while columns VII-X include only solo GVC deals. The average VIF is always below the threshold of 5 in all
models.
Table 10
Effect of GVC design features on investees’ receipt of additional PVC funding: Cox (1972) regressions.
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X
Syndicated deals Included Included Included Included Included Excluded Excluded Excluded Excluded Excluded
Log of company age −0.279 −0.259 −0.260 −0.247 −0.243 −0.291 −0.264 −0.264 −0.251 −0.256
(0.057)⁎⁎⁎ (0.058)***` (0.058)⁎⁎⁎ (0.057)⁎⁎⁎ (0.058)⁎⁎⁎ (0.093)⁎⁎⁎ (0.095)⁎⁎⁎ (0.095)⁎⁎⁎ (0.092)⁎⁎⁎ (0.093)⁎⁎⁎
High-tech 0.534 0.485 0.482 0.538 0.539 0.552 0.491 0.478 0.591 0.569
(0.210)⁎⁎⁎ (0.201)⁎⁎ (0.200)⁎⁎ 0.207)⁎⁎⁎ (0.206)⁎⁎⁎ (0.313)⁎⁎⁎ (0.310) (0.306) (0.310)* (0.314)*
Regional competitiveness 0.610 0.588 0.788 0.722
0.122)⁎⁎⁎ (0.124)⁎⁎⁎ (0.208)⁎⁎⁎ (0.211)⁎⁎⁎
Local deal 0.016 −0.257 −1.841 −0.323 −0.318 0.018 −0.373 −2.451 −0.464 −0.458
(0.133) (0.110)⁎⁎ (0.795)⁎⁎ (0.112)⁎⁎⁎ (0.112)⁎⁎⁎ (0.247) (0.199)* (1.307)* (0.209)⁎⁎ (0.209)⁎⁎
Syndicate 0.951 0.959 0.956 0.970 0.953
(0.130)⁎⁎⁎ (0.128)⁎⁎⁎ (0.128)⁎⁎⁎ (0.129)⁎⁎⁎ (0.129)⁎⁎⁎
Underdeveloped region 0.238 −0.034 −0.003 0.394 −0.036 0.029
(0.138)* (0.111) (0.113) (0.249) (0.202) (0.204)
Underdeveloped region * Local deal −0.895 −1.105
(0.279)⁎⁎⁎ (0.479)⁎⁎
Corruption −0.187 −0.097 −0.219 −0.116
(0.046)⁎⁎⁎ (0.064) (0.071)⁎⁎⁎ (0.089)
Corruption * Local deal −0.194 −0.252
(0.096)⁎⁎ (0.154)
Industry experience 0.010 0.026
(0.006) (0.008)⁎⁎⁎
Syndication experience 0.004 0.008
(0.002)* (0.004)⁎⁎
N of observations 1,230 1,230 1,230 1,230 1,230 635 635 635 635 635
Pseudo R2 0.054 0.054 0.055 0.057 0.057 0.073 0.074 0.076 0.083 0.081
Log pseudolikelihood −2536.6 −2535.3 −2533.5 −2528.1 −2527.8 −712.8 −711.6 −710.3 −705.0 −706.6
This table reports the estimated coefficients and the robust standard errors (in brackets) of Cox (1972) event history-type models. The dependent variable is always
“Additional PVC.” The time until the event is defined by the number of days since the seed-financing round. Industry and time fixed effects are included in all models.
We use Efron's (1977) correction for ties. The significance levels are *: p<0.10; **: p<0.05; and ***: p<0.01.
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the likelihood of syndication and additional PVC funding are negatively
correlated. A failure to control for this should result in downward
biased parameter estimates of the Syndication variable. This is exactly
what we observe by comparing the results in Table 11 and in Table 6.
We conclude that even if the decision to syndicate is endogenous, it will
not affect the previously presented evidence on the impact of GVC
program design features on the ability to bridge equity gaps.
5.4. Alternative measures for underdeveloped regions, room for regulatory
capture, industry and syndication experience
Table 12 reproduces the previous analyses using alternative mea-
sures of regional development, room for regulatory capture, industry
focus, and syndicating tendency.
To measure regional development, we use the per capita GDP at the
local (NUTS2) level instead of the “Regional Competitiveness Index”.
The advantage of per capita GDP is that it varies over time. However,
the disadvantage is that important pillars of the “Regional
Competitiveness Index”, such as education or innovation scores, are
ignored. Furthermore, the variable has missing values because it is not
reported for some regions, which results in a smaller sample size.
Specifications I and III of Table 12 reveal that regional per capita GDP
positively affects the chance of investees to raise PVC in a subsequent
round. In specifications II and IV, we refer to underdeveloped regions as
those where per capita GDP is lower than the national average using the
variable “Underdeveloped Region (GDP)”. The specifications confirm
that GVCs located and simultaneously investing in those
underdeveloped regions are less likely to bridge equity gaps.
In specifications V and VI, we use an alternative measure of cor-
ruption that allows the inclusion of the “Regional Competitiveness
Index” as a covariate. The variable “No limit on contributions to can-
didates” correlates only moderately (0.28) with the “Regional
Competitiveness Index”. The specifications reveal that the joint effect of
the higher likelihood of collusion in locally sourced transactions re-
mains even after controlling for the competitiveness of the investee
firm's location.
Furthermore, we substitute “Industry experience” and “Syndication
experience” with “Industry specialization” and “Syndication speciali-
zation”. These indicators are calculated using the respective experience
measures but divided by the total number of deals of a particular GVC
until the time of a focal transaction. In other terms, these new variables
present percentages of investments carried out in a particular industry
or together with a private syndicate partner. The specifications VII-X
demonstrate the positive effect of both experience measures on the
probability of bridging equity gaps.
5.5. Sample split
In this section, we analyze the impact of the heterogeneity of our
sample transactions on the ability of GVCs to bridge equity gaps. In the
first step, we split high-tech and low-tech ventures. These investees are
more strongly affected by information asymmetries (e.g., Martí and
Quas, 2018) and have higher perceived investment risks. The task of
GVCs to bridge equity gaps is therefore more important for this sector.
Table 11
Effect of GVC design features on investees’ receipt of additional PVC funding: bivariate probit model.
I II III IV V
Dependent variable: Syndicate
Company age (log) 0.053 0.051 0.052 0.053 0.053
(0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039)
High-tech 0.683 0.689 0.691 0.695 0.695
(0.154)⁎⁎⁎ (0.154)⁎⁎⁎ (0.154)⁎⁎⁎ (0.154)⁎⁎⁎ (0.154)⁎⁎⁎
Number of active PVC investors 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004
(0.001)⁎⁎⁎ (0.001)⁎⁎⁎ (0.001)⁎⁎⁎ (0.001)⁎⁎⁎ (0.001)⁎⁎⁎
Syndication experience 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006
(0.001)⁎⁎⁎ (0.001)⁎⁎⁎ (0.001)⁎⁎⁎ (0.002)⁎⁎⁎ (0.002)⁎⁎⁎
Dependent variable: Additional PVC
Company age (log) −0.173 −0.156 −0.157 −0.158 −0.157
(0.040)⁎⁎⁎ (0.040)⁎⁎⁎ (0.040)⁎⁎⁎ (0.041)⁎⁎⁎ (0.041)⁎⁎⁎
High-tech 0.134 0.108 0.117 0.201 0.197
(0.161) (0.160) (0.163) (0.188) (0.190)
Regional competitiveness 0.381 0.375
(0.089)⁎⁎⁎ (0.088)⁎⁎⁎
Local deal 0.049 −0.142 −1.035 −0.180 −0.178
(0.090) (0.077) (0.521)⁎⁎⁎ (0.083)⁎⁎ (0.083)⁎⁎
Syndicates 1.782 1.790 1.778 1.647 1.651
(0.155)⁎⁎⁎ (0.158)⁎⁎⁎ (0.169)⁎⁎⁎ (0.267)⁎⁎⁎ (0.269)⁎⁎⁎
Underdeveloped region 0.120 −0.088 −0.070
(0.094) (0.075) (0.076)
Underdeveloped regions −0.628
* Local deal (0.173)⁎⁎⁎
Corruption −0.110 −0.058
(0.032)⁎⁎⁎ (0.044)
Corruption * Local deal −0.111
(0.064)*
Industry experience 0.002
(0.005)
Syndication experience 0.001
(0.002)
Chi2 of the significance of Rho 14.91⁎⁎⁎ 13.78⁎⁎⁎ 12.17⁎⁎⁎ 5.38⁎⁎ 5.40⁎⁎
N 1230 1230 1230 1230 1230
Log pseudolikelihood −1322.07 −1323.14 −1321.82 −1318.88 −1318.97
This table reports the coefficients and robust standard errors (in brackets) of the bivariate probit regressions of the dependent variables “Syndicate” and “Additional
PVC” on different sets of independent variables and controls. Industry and time fixed effects, as well as a constant term, are included in all models. The analysis
includes the full sample of 1,230 observations. The significance levels are *: p<0.10; **: p<0.05; and ***: p<0.01.
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Table 12
Effect of GVC design features on investees’ receipt of additional PVC funding: alternative measures for underdeveloped regions, regulatory capture, industry focus
and syndication tendency.
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X
Syndicated deals Included Included Excluded Excluded Included Excluded Included Excluded Included Excluded
Company age (log) −0.188*** −0.189*** −0.139** −0.127** −0.174*** −0.145** −0.173*** −0.152*** −0.179*** −0.142**
(0.046) (0.046) (0.060) (0.059) (0.043) (0.057) (0.043) (0.057) (0.044) (0.057)
High-tech 0.489*** 0.499*** 0.471** 0.462** 0.478*** 0.368* 0.465*** 0.387* 0.469*** 0.381*
(0.159) (0.160) (0.219) (0.219) (0.154) (0.214) (0.154) (0.213) (0.153) (0.210)
Local per capita GDP 0.013*** 0.012**
(0.003) (0.005)
Local deal −0.316*** −0.019 −0.331** −0.020 0.057 0.166 −0.263*** −0.363*** −0.283*** −0.361***
(0.096) (0.119) (0.143) (0.192) (0.158) (0.240) (0.088) (0.136) (0.090) (0.137)
Syndicates 0.743*** 0.737*** 0.749*** 0.768*** 0.654***
(0.095) (0.096) (0.093) (0.093) (0.095)
Underdeveloped region (GDP) −0.048 0.120
(0.112) (0.170)
Underdeveloped region (GDP) * −0.492*** −0.447*
Local deal (0.181) (0.265)
Regional competitiveness 0.433*** 0.476*** 0.475*** 0.504*** 0.449*** 0.446***
(0.093) (0.132) (0.090) (0.130) (0.092) (0.133)
No limit on contributions
to candidates 0.256* 0.290
(0.139) (0.211)
No limit on contributions
* Local deal −0.451** −0.789***
(0.188) (0.283)
Industry specialization 0.613** 0.670*
(0.255) (0.387)
Syndicating specialization 0.624*** 0.407*
(0.142) (0.227)
N of observations 1149 1149 584 584 1230 635 1230 635 1230 635
Pseudo R2 0.183 0.182 0.155 0.152 0.195 0.189 0.195 0.181 0.204 0.182
Log pseudolikelihood −587.27 −588.32 −238.89 −239.62 −618.28 −251.92 −618.67 −254.60 −611.65 −254.27
This table reports the coefficients and robust standard errors (in brackets) of the probit regressions of our dependent variable “Additional PVC” on different sets of
independent variables and controls. Industry and time fixed effects, as well as a constant term, are included in all models. The significance levels are *: p<0.10; **:
p<0.05; and ***: p<0.01.
Table 13
Effect of GVC design features on investees’ receipt of additional PVC funding: high-tech sectors vs other sectors.
I II III IV V VI VII VIII
Sample High-tech High-tech High-tech High-tech Others Others Others Others
Company age (log) −0.365*** −0.365*** −0.330*** −0.340*** −0.099* −0.066 −0.060 −0.052
(0.073) (0.073) (0.072) (0.072) (0.053) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054)
Syndicates 0.766*** 0.766*** 0.773*** 0.758*** 0.691*** 0.687*** 0.692*** 0.676***
(0.126) (0.128) (0.129) (0.129) (0.150) (0.149) (0.148) (0.148)
Regional competitiveness 0.381*** 0.395*** 0.477*** 0.461***
(0.140) (0.140) (0.125) (0.129)
Local deal 0.200 −1.312 −0.098 −0.113 −0.157 −1.291* −0.345** −0.346**
(0.140) (1.043) (0.121) (0.120) (0.160) (0.727) (0.140) (0.139)
Underdeveloped regions 0.386*** 0.169 −0.079 −0.341**
(0.144) (0.120) (0.180) (0.143)
Underdeveloped regions −0.817*** −0.792**
* Local deal (0.269) (0.342)
Corruption −0.040 −0.093
(0.085) (0.062)
Corruption * Local deal −0.157 −0.114
(0.127) (0.091)
Industry experience 0.014*** −0.001
(0.005) (0.011)
Syndication experience 0.003* 0.002
(0.002) (0.003)
N of observations 622 622 622 622 608 608 608 608
Pseudo R2 0.17 0.165 0.177 0.172 0.175 0.181 0.179 0.18
Log likelihood −354.77 −356.77 −351.41 −353.60 −242.18 −240.41 −240.83 −240.58
This table reports the coefficients and robust standard errors (in brackets) of the probit regressions of our dependent variable “Additional PVC” on different sets of
independent variables and controls. The significance levels are *: p<0.10; **: p<0.05; and ***: p<0.01. Columns I-IV include deals in high-tech sectors, while
columns V-VIII include deals in other sectors. Industry and time fixed effects, as well as a constant term, are included in all estimates.
Y. Alperovych, et al. Research Policy xxx (xxxx) xxxx
14
Table 13 presents the results. We find a strong negative impact of
age for high-tech companies. “Syndicate” and “Regional competitive-
ness” have a positive impact of the same magnitude in the two sub-
samples. The negative influence of colocation is more severe in low
technology transactions. Colocation is harmful in underdeveloped re-
gions in both subsamples. Lastly, we find that GVC industry and syn-
dication experience matter only in high-technology deals.
In the next step, we differentiate “seed and early-stage” from “later-
stage” deals according to the judgements made by the providers of the
sample data.10 The probit regression results are presented in Table 14.
The positive impact of syndicates and regional competitiveness is strong
and significant across all specifications. However, the investee's age and
high-technology orientation are significant in early-stage transactions
only. More importantly, the negative effect of colocation in under-
developed regions, or in corrupted countries, and the positive impact of
GVC industry and syndication experience are also driven by early-stage
transactions.
In a final sample split, we analyze whether the propensity to suc-
cessfully bridge equity gaps changes over time. Our sampling cut-off
dates include the global financial crisis period. During and shortly after
the crisis, it was particularly difficult for entrepreneurial ventures to
raise funds (Block et al., 2010). We therefore split our sample into GVC
transactions before the end of 2007 (728) and thereafter (506). The
probit regression results presented in Table 15 reveal differences be-
tween the two periods. First, it was simpler for high-tech ventures lo-
cated in more competitive regions to raise additional PVC only before
the crisis. After the crisis, we detect no advantage. Second, the colo-
cation of investors and investees in underdeveloped regions has a strong
negative impact on both subsamples, and the effect of colocation in
corrupted countries was stronger after the crisis.
6. Conclusion
Policymakers have a strong motivation for being actors in the en-
trepreneurial finance market and facilitating YICs’ access to finance. For
example, they have a clear interest in spurring innovation, creating
employment and wealth, receiving tax revenues and making social
contributions, of which YICs are important drivers. They also aim to
support less developed regions and infrastructures. Therefore, they
design funding and support programs where GVC funds directly inject
capital into young ventures. One major argument made by policy-
makers is a requirement to “bridge equity gaps” for YICs that suffer
from a lack of capital supply. Such government interventions are cri-
ticized in the academic literature, e.g., in Brown et al. (2017),
Cumming and Macintosh (2006), and Shane (2009). It is also ques-
tionable whether these government interventions actually help foster
entrepreneurship, employment, and growth of investees. Grilli and
Murtinu (2014) find that GVC financing does not spur sales or employee
growth of European YICs and argue that public interventions should
focus on the creation of a favorable environment via indirect forms of
support rather than by adopting a ‘hands-on-approach’.
GVC fund initiatives nevertheless exist and continuously grow in
investment volume, especially in Europe. European market data reveal
that 29% of the funds provided to back YICs come from government
agencies.11 The recent implementation of the European Fund for Stra-
tegic Investments (EFSI), whose official goal is to “close the investment
gap caused by the financial and economic crisis”,12 signals that this type
of public intervention will sustain for some time.
Table 14
Effect of GVC design features on investees’ receipt of additional PVC funding: seed and early stages vs later stages.
I II III IV V VI VII VIII
Sample Early stage Early stage Early stage Early stage Later stage Later stage Later stage Later stage
Company age (log) −0.245*** −0.236*** −0.212*** −0.209*** −0.095 −0.067 −0.089 −0.098
(0.077) (0.078) (0.075) (0.076) (0.062) (0.062) (0.063) (0.063)
High-tech 0.585*** 0.523*** 0.571*** 0.591*** 0.270 0.272 0.255 0.250
(0.194) (0.193) (0.194) (0.196) (0.270) (0.275) (0.273) (0.273)
Syndicates 0.800*** 0.809*** 0.815*** 0.786*** 0.698*** 0.679*** 0.738*** 0.764***
(0.113) (0.115) (0.114) (0.115) (0.172) (0.171) (0.173) (0.177)
Regional competitiveness 0.407*** 0.369*** 0.570*** 0.590***
(0.119) (0.121) (0.139) (0.139)
Local deal 0.103 −2.139** −0.192* −0.174 −0.148 −0.578 −0.282* −0.263*
(0.131) (0.856) (0.113) (0.112) (0.191) (0.864) (0.158) (0.155)
Underdeveloped regions 0.302** 0.070 −0.155 −0.280*
(0.131) (0.110) (0.229) (0.166)
Underdeveloped regions * Local deal −0.947*** −0.253
(0.252) (0.344)
Corruption −0.016 −0.154*
(0.068) (0.083)
Corruption * Local deal −0.244** −0.037
(0.105) (0.109)
Industry experience 0.009* −0.002
(0.005) (0.011)
Syndication experience 0.005** −0.004
(0.002) (0.004)
N of observations 768 768 768 768 462 462 462 462
Pseudo R2 0.177 0.175 0.179 0.182 0.213 0.227 0.235 0.237
Log likelihood −418.35 −419.629 −417.729 −416.211 −190.925 −187.56 −185.613 −185.01
This table reports the coefficients and robust standard errors (in brackets) of the probit regressions of our dependent variable “Additional PVC” on different sets of
independent variables and controls. The significance levels are *: p<0.10; **: p<0.05; and ***: p<0.01. Columns I-IV include deals in the early stages of devel-
opment, while columns V-VIII include deals in the later stages of development. Industry and time fixed effects, as well as a constant term, are included in all
estimates.
10 We also use the age of the firm at the time of the investment, with 6 years
or older as a cutoff instead of the stage of development in an unreported ro-
bustness check. This classification splits our sample less evenly and reveals that
the results are even stronger for the younger companies.
11 Invest Europe: European Private Equity Activity Report 2017, https://
www.investeurope.eu.
12 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/juncker-plan-
factsheet-july2018_en.pdf.
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For this reason, we focus on typical design features of GVC in-
itiatives and the efficacy thereof. We analyze the impact of the loca-
tion/colocation, syndication and industry focus design features on three
success measures for 1230 GVC investments in 16 European countries.
We find that GVC is less likely to accomplish its mission of “bridging the
equity gap” if the investees are older and are located in economically
lagging regions. Furthermore, GVC policies are less successful if targets
are sourced locally. The negative effect is even stronger if the GVCs and
the ventures are collocated in underdeveloped regions or in countries
with higher perceived corruption. Syndication with private capital in-
vestors improves the chances of achieving the “bridging the gap” goals.
Moreover, GVCs improve their skills by accumulating industry-specific
knowledge and syndication experience. Our results hold regardless of
the success measure we employ (the target's receipt of an additional
PVC funding, total asset growth, and innovation output). In addition,
we verify our results with several robustness checks, including the
analysis of the endogenous nature of syndication decisions.
Our paper therefore contributes to the debate on how GVC in-
itiatives can more effectively accomplish their goals. It is advised that
future policy consider the detected strengths and weaknesses of some of
the typical design features. While GVCs are the category of VC investors
which is more likely to invest nearby (Bertoni et al., 2015), our first
recommendation for policymakers is not to restrict GVCs to local in-
vestments, especially in underdeveloped regions. Localizing GVCs in
underdeveloped regions limits their access to private capital investors,
who are often not locally available and who are difficult to attract from
more developed areas. Instead, promising YICs in underdeveloped re-
gions should be supported by national GVC policies, which obviously
can more easily exploit scale and learning effects, and can better link
with private capital investors. Regardless of the level of local devel-
opment, local GVC investments are more likely to be exposed to col-
lusion and inefficiencies due to the political nature of GVCs
(Bertoni and Quas, 2016; Liben-Nowell et al., 2005). Again, we re-
commend incentivizing geographically distant and diversified invest-
ments, which are less likely to be affected by regulatory capture. In
sum, while geographical distance has a negative effect on PVC invest-
ments (e.g., Cumming and Dai, 2010), we reveal that it may be bene-
ficial for GVCs.
Our second recommendation to policymakers is to request GVCs to
syndicate with PVCs whenever this is possible. Ample evidence has
shown that syndicated PVC-GVC deals outperform solo GVC invest-
ments (e.g., Bertoni and Tykvová, 2015; Cumming et al., 2017). We
extend our understanding by showing that the benefits of GVC/PVC
syndication persist over the life of a GVC fund. GVCs benefit from their
private partners’ experience and improve their own selection and in-
vestment skills, which they can then use even when they invest alone to
achieve investment success.
Third, and perhaps in contrast with the recommendation of other
studies that address similar issues (Brown et al., 2017; Shane, 2009), we
support the establishment of GVC funds with a precise industry focus.
We find that GVCs can and do learn from their own industry-specific
experience and should therefore specialize rather than invest across
many sectors.
The limitations of our analyses are mostly caused by the availability
of the data, but they pave the way to interesting avenues for future
research. First, we do not include information on other measures of
success for our sample companies, such as their revenue, profits, or
number of employees. Such measures would be relevant to assess
whether GVCs are able to achieve their mission of supporting growth
but are, unfortunately, difficult to collect for startups. Along the same
line, it would be interesting to differentiate the commercial activities
and innovativeness of the business plans of the GVC-backed ventures to
sort out the selection and treatment effects of GVCs with different de-
sign features. We are further lacking qualitative data that could help
assessing the ability of entrepreneurs or GVC fund managers. Such data
could allow us to test if GVC funds located in underdeveloped regions
could also have difficulties in attracting skilled human capital.
Additionally, there may be some heterogeneity among GVC programs
and funds themselves that is not captured by our data. It is possible, for
example, that using different incentive schemes to attract fund
Table 15
Effect of GVC design features on investees’ receipt of additional PVC funding: before vs after the global financial crisis.
I II III IV V VI VII VIII
Sample Before 2008 Before 2008 Before 2008 Before 2008 Since 2008 Since 2008 Since 2008 Since 2008
Company age (log) −0.132** −0.112** −0.119** −0.115** −0.318*** −0.334*** −0.277*** −0.270***
(0.053) (0.054) (0.054) (0.053) (0.077) (0.078) (0.077) (0.078)
High-tech 0.607*** 0.568*** 0.586*** 0.578*** 0.136 0.178 0.209 0.203
(0.188) (0.190) (0.190) (0.189) (0.292) (0.285) (0.293) (0.290)
Syndicates 0.727*** 0.713*** 0.754*** 0.738*** 0.642*** 0.628*** 0.622*** 0.605***
(0.117) (0.117) (0.117) (0.116) (0.138) (0.139) (0.138) (0.138)
Regional competitiveness 0.505*** 0.482*** 0.168 0.155
(0.107) (0.108) (0.145) (0.149)
Local deal 0.032 −1.112 −0.174 −0.162 0.075 −1.828* −0.234* −0.226*
(0.134) (0.733) (0.113) (0.115) (0.161) (1.027) (0.133) (0.135)
Underdeveloped regions −0.024 −0.300** 0.461*** 0.272**
(0.160) (0.122) (0.153) (0.132)
Underdeveloped regions * Local deal −0.491* −0.889***
(0.256) (0.333)
Corruption −0.188*** 0.163**
(0.067) (0.078)
Corruption * Local deal −0.112 −0.214*
(0.090) (0.130)
Industry experience 0.014 0.006
(0.010) (0.005)
Syndication experience 0.001 0.002
(0.004) (0.002)
N of observations 724 724 724 724 506 506 506 506
Pseudo R2 0.22 0.245 0.233 0.231 0.134 0.129 0.122 0.121
Log likelihood −353.22 −341.84 −347.19 −348.25 −273.38 −275.00 −277.22 −277.40
This table reports the coefficients and robust standard errors (in brackets) of the probit regressions of our dependent variable “Additional PVC” on different sets of
independent variables and controls. The significance levels are *: p<0.10; **: p<0.05; and ***: p<0.01. Columns I-IV include deals carried out before 2008, while
columns V-VIII include deals carried out since 2008. Industry and time fixed effects, as well as a constant term, are included in all estimates.
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managers affect the individual GVCs’ achieved results. We are unable to
control for these aspects but recognize them as interesting avenues for
future research. Another important limitation is the European focus of
our dataset. GVC programs targeted to YICs have been created else-
where, such as in the US (Lerner, 2010), Canada (Cumming, 2007) and
even China (Guan and Yam, 2015). Expanding the analysis of the design
features of GVC programs to an international sample would certainly
bear interesting results.
Further work is also warranted on some specific aspects linked with
the design of GVCs. For instance, future studies could deepen our un-
derstanding of how precisely political distortions influence GVCs’ in-
vestment decisions, especially in local deals. We contribute to the em-
pirical evidence on the consequences of the PVC-GVC syndication, but
further analysis should tackle the drivers of such phenomena, specifi-
cally addressing the free-riding mechanisms and agency problems that
may influence the relationship between public and private actors.
Finally, while we only observe realized GVC investments, it would be
interesting to have information on the actual demand for external
equity from YICs and understand whether GVC funds step in after in-
vestees already solicited capital elsewhere but have been rejected or if
they directly compete with the private sector. If they back ventures that
failed to convince private investors but are able to raise private capital
after the GVC contribution, then GVCs have a truly meaningful role to
bridge such equity gaps.
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